



Take a bow: Art and dog communication 
Bentham’s query “[…] the question is not can they reason? Nor can they talk? 
But, Can they suffer?” (Bentham 8) drew attention away from language and the 
interior life of animals and focused it instead on the question of suffering. Just 
what suffering is left to the human to decide; a debate, which forms a large part 
of the discourse in the animal rights movement. But what happens if we were to 
return to the unanswered part of Bentham’s quote, the questions that Descartes 
so famously answered in the negative: “Can they reason?” “Can they talk?” 
These questions have been banned by scientific and philosophical discourse up 
until recently when the burgeoning interest in the ‘animal question’ re-opened 
the debate. Making the assumption that animals can indeed ‘talk’ I investigate 
the nature of dog/human/dog communication using as a conduit the art of South 
African artists, Elizabeth Gunter, Daniel Naudé and myself. I propose that dog 
to human and human to dog communication relies on nonverbal means such 
as bodily semiotics, prosody and other ineffable means that are not dependent 
on symbolic language. Keywords: anthropomorphism; art; behaviour; dogs; 
language
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“We have shut our ears to their primal screams, their rumbles, hisses, 
purrs […]”
 –  Wilma Cruise qtd. by B. Schmahmann in the catalogue  
Cocks, Asses & …
“All knowledge, the totality of all questions and all answers, is contained 
in the dog. If one could but realize this knowledge, if one could but bring 
it into the light of day.”
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The context of my research is neither scientific nor philosophical but rather, 
unusually, artistic. I take my justification from, amongst others, J. M. Coetzee’s fic-
tional character Elizabeth Costello, who says that it is via poetics that understand-
ing with the animals might be reached. Her implication is that it is through affect 
rather than reason that we get closer to the animal other. It can be argued, then, 
that the largely unconscious means of creation in the studio mimics that of the 
inchoate communication that takes place between human and the animal other. 
Accessing animal minds is a relatively new phenomenon. Based on Descartes’ 
assertion that only humans think and that the animals are mere automata, it was 
assumed that animals did not have capacity to reason, let alone feel emotion. The 
separation of human and the (other) animal and the superiority of one above the 
other is entrenched in the Judeo-Christian system of belief as expressed in God’s 
injunction in Genesis that the (hu)man should “have dominion over the fish of 
the sea, and the fowl of the air, and over every living thing that moveth upon 
the earth” (Genesis 1:28). Arguably the Cartesian, mechanistic view reached its 
apogee in the behaviourist movement of the mid-twentieth century. Behaviourism 
was, inter alia, a reaction to the psychoanalytical models of psychology of Freud 
and Jung specifically claiming that neither the id and the ego, nor the collective 
unconscious, were identifiable and measurable in empirical terms, and therefore 
that the effects, even existence, of these entities was in question. Behaviourism 
had a philosophical underpinning in the theories of logical positivism, and was 
associated chiefly with philosophers of the Vienna School. Logical positivists 
rejected the metaphysics of traditional philosophy and based their thinking on 
pragmatic principles of science and logic. In these terms philosophy’s task was “to 
reduce statements to their empirical components and to verify their truth claims” 
(Macey 232). In the behaviourist model, animals are biological subjects, subjected 
to pre-determined stimuli to which they react in predictable and pre-determined 
ways. What this meant for the study of animals is that the animal is reduced to a 
responding bio-automaton. This extreme determinist view affirmed the Cartesian 
view of animal-as-machine. 
Does the animal speak? Does it think? What is the nature of its thought? These 
are the conundrums that the behaviourists refused to face. By raising the spectre 
of anthropomorphism they drew ever further away from engaging in a meaning-
ful sense with (other) animals. But, as John Berger suggests, in the prescientific 
age it was precisely anthropomorphism and the projection of imaginative empa-
thy that connected us to the animals and kept us in (empathetic) proximity to 
them (Berger 252). Jacques Derrida concurs. In his naked encounter with his little 
cat, he tried imagining the world from her point of view. Thereby engaging with 
his cat Derrida felt himself looking deep into the eyes of God: “I hear the cat or 
God ask itself, ask me: Is he going to call me, is he going to address me?” The cat 
did this without “breathing a word”. Deprived of language the animal is rendered 
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mute and in its muteness there is a great sadness. Yet in spite of its silence, its lack 
of logos, Derrida admits to the possibility that the animal thinks. “The animal 
looks at us, and we are naked before it. Thinking perhaps begins there” (Derrida 
29). Thinking about (the animal’s) thinking is the point. It is a leap into the terri-
tory banned from the Cartesians’ and behaviourists’ lexicon. 
The encounter with his cat is a key moment in Derrida’s exposition of The 
Animal That Therefore I Am. It is important to note that Derrida did not pose a 
philosophical question in the vacuum of abstract thought. Instead he based his 
query on a real experience. His encounter with his little cat was in the bathroom 
when she saw him naked. She was neither a generic animal nor a generic cat. 
Derrida’s investigation is thus not merely the machinations of a philosopher but a 
particular autobiographical experience.
No, no, my cat, the cat that looks at me in my bedroom or bathroom, this cat that 
is perhaps not “my cat” my “pussycat,” does not appear here to represent, like 
an ambassador the immense symbolic responsibility with which our culture has 
always charged the feline race. If I say, “it is a real cat” that sees me naked, this is 
in order to mark its unsubstitutable singularity. (9) 
But how do we access animals’ minds? Faced with Wittgenstein’s statement “If a 
lion could talk, we could not understand him” (qtd. in Wolfe, “In the shadow”, 44), 
we are faced with a seemingly impossible conundrum. It is not only the barrier 
of symbolic language that we have to scale, but the notion that animals have an 
epistemic knowledge that is so different from ours that it is virtually unknow-
able. Further, even if we were to have access to animal minds, our language would 
be inadequate in dealing with the contents of it. Also, it is entirely possible that 
animals think in a different format from human natural language, a difference as 
marked as that between analogue and digital forms (Beck 254).1 
Nevertheless, since we do understand a lot of animal communication, Beck 
suggests we share an evolutionary “core cognition”, one that permits cross-species 
mutuality (Beck 255). That is, we do know what other species think and feel with-
out being sure how, or even precisely what, we know. This notion accords with 
Elizabeth Costello’s idea of sympathetic imagination. Sympathetic imagination is 
the ability to imagine yourself in the place of the other even if the other is a non-
human animal. There are no limits, she maintains, to sympathetic imagining. “If I 
think my way into the existence of a being that never existed, then I can think my 
way into the existence of a bat or a chimpanzee or an oyster, any being with whom 
I share the substrate of life” (Coetzee 80). 
But what Costello is talking about is still communication from the human trans-
posed and imagined onto the animal. It is a one-way street as it were. Where is the 
responding living animal in the abstract scenarios that Costello evokes? Donna 
Haraway draws comparisons between Costello and another of Coetzee’s fictional 
characters, Bev Shaw, the volunteer animal caretaker in Disgrace, whose task is 
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to euthanise condemned dogs. This duty she does with respect and regard for 
her charges. Haraway says that Costello seems to be locked into the abstractions 
of her lectures without engaging with actual animals in messy co-entanglements 
(Haraway 81). But Haraway’s accusation might also be a touch unfair. Costello 
herself objects to the cold reason of the philosophers preferring the company of 
those who engage with the animals. “[I]f reason is what sets me part from the 
veal calf, then thank you but no thank you, I’ll talk to someone else” (Coetzee 
112). Nevertheless, Haraway points towards the necessity of multi-directional 
relationships between humans and (other) animals. Conceding the asymmetry of 
such relationships she advocates a response/response-ability, post humanist (non-
humanist) way of interacting in which “a relationship is crafted in intra-action 
through which entities, subjects and objects, come into being. […] If this struc-
ture of material-semiotic relating breaks down or is not permitted to be reborn, 
then nothing but objectification and oppression remains” (Haraway 71). 
Similarily Marc Bekoff, a cognitive ethologist, argues for intra-action between 
species based on a biocentrically anthropomorphic position (Bekoff, “Wild Jus-
tice” 72). What he means by this is that it is necessary to approach animal behav-
iour from a species’ specific point of view. Thus when studying dogs it is necessary 
to be “dog-o-centrist”, chimp-o-centric when studying chimpanzees, and so on. 
Wendy Woodward terms such stances “relational epistemologies” (Woodward 3). 
For example, the perception of a cat from a mouse’s point of view (a terrifying 
predator) would be different from that of the human’s (a cuddly pet). Beckoff has 
inter alia studied the evolution of morality in a variety of species particularly those 
that function in groups. Observing canids at play he has documented the opera-
tion of justice and fairness, concepts that can be (anthropomorphically) inferred 
from a number of discrete behaviour patterns including “the bow”. 
Wilma Cruise Take a Bow: The Caucus—Puppy (2011–2012). Bronze (Edition 10), 45 x 84 
x 33 cm. Pup—Zara (2013–2014). Bronze (Edition 10), 75 x 63 x 48 cm. (Photographed 
by Pierre Van der Spuy).
The bow is a frequent behaviour in dog games—a behaviour I captured in my 
2014 work Pup Zara (2013–2014) and The Caucus—Puppy (2011–2012). The 
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Caucus—Puppy is based on John Tenniel’s original illustration in Alice’s Adven-
tures in Wonderland. 
John Tenniel’s puppy (Carroll 45)
In the book the puppy’s playful stance is an exhortation to Alice to join in a game 
of catch. But Alice has shrunk to a fraction of her normal size. She is terrified of the 
giant, rambunctious puppy and hides under a thistle bush. In spite of her terror Alice 
recognizes that the puppy is only doing what puppies are meant to do. “And yet what 
a dear little puppy it was!” she says while planning her escape (Carroll 46). 
In the sculpture’s scenario, the puppies invite the other pup, Zara, to play by 
assuming the position of a mock bow. Bemused, Zara watches their antics. It is 
just an instant before she leaps in to join the game—a moment that any observers 
of dog play will recognize. The placement of the dogs occurred by chance. The 
sculptures were in fact made some time apart but once put in relational proximity 
the gap between became a conduit for communication and thereby became the 
raison d’être of the works. The dog’s behaviour becomes recognized by other dogs 
but more importantly also becomes recognized by other humans—as is captured 
in these images of a 14-month-old child responding to what is actually, in reality, 
two lumps of metal. 
A child interacts with Pup Zara at Boschendal Wine Estate 2017.
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Thus if one has to regard language as more than the one spoken by humans the 
possibility exists of a multiplicity of species languages. Following Bekoff there 
would be, for example ‘Dog’ and ‘Horse’, two languages I am reasonably familiar 
with. But here is the caveat. Before we can assign language to animals it behooves 
us to define the term, for the blatant fact remains that logocentric language in all 
its ability for infinite permutations and abstractions remains a uniquely human 
phenomenon. Noam Chomsky proposed the concept of an innate human ability 
for language—a hardwiring of what he calls a Universal Grammar. Basically this 
claim re-asserts human exceptionalism along the traditional divide of language—
humans speak, animals are dumb.2 
During the ’70s and ’80s there were many attempts made to raise chimpanzees 
with humans, assuming that they would pick up the rudiments of language from 
the environment. These experiments failed in that chimpanzees did not acquire 
symbolic language beyond the most basic level and then only through hours of 
operant conditioning. But what the experimenters chose to ignore was the pro-
found emotional communication that was actually occurring between the apes 
and their human handlers. There was communication between the species but 
it was an affective one based on bodily semiotics. Language was being spoken 
but not the logocentric one that the experimenters focused on. It was a wordless 
transaction of profound emotion.
This tension between word and wordlessness is expressed in a series of draw-
ings of dogs entitled “Keep” by the South African artist Elizabeth Gunter. Gunter 
explores the boundaries of language in relationship to animals. 
Elizabeth Gunter Keep. Spier Contemporary 2007, at The Africa Centre, Spier Estate, 
December 2007–December 2008.
She recalls that as a child she imagined herself as a small animal without knowl-
edge of self. She had been told by her father that animals were without speech, 
reason or self-awareness. Projecting herself into an animal lost in the world, and 
lost to the world, was strangely comforting. 
I […] became aware of a wordless centre, a muteness that is not without mean-
ing. It is that muteness that I try to mark, because to my mind it is where I find 
mutuality with animals, or where I feel my own animality. Some idea of what 
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non-human animals feel like—the same as what I feel/experience when I draw: 
mute meaning. (Gunter n. p.) 
Through the act of drawing she is able to achieve a sympathetic if not empathetic 
identification with the animal. She says:
Keep attempts to portray a collective desire for engaged membership and equality 
by means of silent yet playful gesture. The dog and its body language are chosen as 
symbolic of a singular and often misread or inadequate means of communication 
with humans, and to emphasise its wordlessness and insularity. This wordlessness 
is contrasted with written words, communicating commands that would, if sub-
mitted to, result in total disempowerment or disablement of the very energy and 
exuberant gestures of the dogs. (Gunter qtd. in Pather, n. p.)
This willingness to engage the animal qua animal in its full specificity and singu-
larity is echoed in the work of the South African photographer Daniel Naudé. 
Daniel Naudé Africanis17. Danielskuil, Northern Cape, 25 February 2010.
He creates images of feral dogs in a way that focuses as much on the animal being 
as on the human on the other side of the gaze. The impetus for his collection of 
animal photographs in Animal Farm (Naudé 9) was inspired by the look of a feral 
Africanis dog, which for “a split second looked back at him” before slinking off 
leaving him “speechless and full of emotion”. 
The intensity of that shared glimpse made Naudé determined to depict the dogs 
in a way that captured their presence and their experience (Naudé 7). Like Der-
rida’s cat, Naudé’s dog was singular and particular to that moment. What exactly 
was communicated during that fleeting exchange, however, remains “unfathom-
able, unexplained and yet incredibly potent” (Naudé 9). Naudé has identified the 
problematic of the space-between the human and animal gaze, which implies 
the key question of what happens in this space. Broglio identifies this space as 
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“the contact zone” (xxiii). What is communicated? Who is this being doing the 
communicating? Echoing Naudé’s report of the unfathomability of the exchange 
between human and animal, he says that “the human-animal contact zone 
becomes a contact without contact, a relation of nonrelations and communication 
whose language would be under erasure” (Broglio xxiv).
Moving from a humanist position to one that encompasses other animals sug-
gests other ways of thinking of animal languages. One such idea is to abandon 
the model of anthropocentric symbolic language against which other animal lan-
guages are tested. In this context, Carl Safina has proposed the concept of “pros-
ody” (202). Prosody—the patterns of rhythm and sound used in poetry—con-
stitutes paralinguistic features of song, tempo and tone, which convey meaning 
without words. While a dog is incapable of using words, it is nevertheless able to 
communicate via bodily semiotics and sounds which, crossing species’ barriers, 
human beings are able to understand. For example, we are able to interpret our 
dog’s whine even though we are not a dog. We know that a growl means some-
thing different from a bark; and that a cat’s hiss differs from her purr. It is not, as 
the Cheshire cat suggests, “madness” that we know the difference between a dog 
growling when he is angry, and wagging his tail when it is pleased, and the cat 
growling when she is pleased and wagging her tail when she is angry (Carroll 64). 
We are quite capable of interpreting such situations correctly and acting upon 
them in the appropriate manner. Prosody enables us to distinguish a lullaby from 
a scream in humans, or a short upward call indicating alarm from a soothing 
downward one in other animals. That is, sound, without words, carries emotion 
and meaning and notably this occurs across species. Prosody links us to other ani-
mals. It might be that which re-establishes the sacred connection to other animals. 
Wilma Cruise, Papio Ursinus (2012–2016). Bronze and found object (Edition 10), 69 x 63 
x 43 cm. Pup—Zara (2013–2014). Bronze (Edition 10), 75 x 63 x 48 cm. (Photographed 
by Pierre van der Spuy.)
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Yet, hampered by the fear of anthropomorphism, researchers are reluctant to 
translate these sounds. With reference to Joyce Poole’s work with the African 
elephant, Carl Safina notes that while Poole takes meticulous recordings of the 
elephants’ vocalisations, using measurable scientific means such as the frequency 
and amplitude of the sounds, other than noting the context in which they are 
made, she fails to interpret their vocalisations. She does not translate from ele-
phants’ language to human language. In this way her experimental methodology, 
and others like it, does not reach beyond description. In other words, we know 
that the animals are communicating, but not what they are saying. Safina accuses 
these researchers of ignoring the obvious: “At its simplest if the animal behaves 
joyously in a joyous situation, it would be the most uncomplicated and direct to 
interpret the emotion of joy” (29). Our inability, or refusal, to translate renders us 
tone deaf to their utterances.
Do other animals have a consciousness of themselves as separate individuals? 
If animals do have what has been termed “a theory of mind”, the next logical ques-
tion is how do we identify it? One such means is the mirror self-recognition test 
(MSR), developed by Gordon Gallup in 1970. An animal is marked on a part of 
its body with ink. If the animal on viewing itself in a mirror tries to wipe the spot 
off its own body, it is said to demonstrate self-recognition. Gallup argues that this 
is evidence of self-concept (qtd. in Wynne and Udell 190). The number of species 
that pass the mirror self-recognition test is quite limited and seems to be confined 
to the great apes. It excludes dogs. Does one then conclude that dogs do not have 
self-recognition? This deduction is challenged by amongst others, Marc Bekoff, 
who in his classical “yellow snow” experiment, demonstrated that dogs have self-
recognition based on a sense of smell. After compiling and statistically analysing 
the data, Bekoff found that Jethro, his own dog and the subject of the experi-
ment, paid significantly less attention to his own displaced urine than he did to 
the displaced urine of other dogs. In his paper “Observations of scent-marking 
and discriminating self from others by a domestic dog”, Bekoff did not specifically 
claim that this proves that dogs have self-awareness, but the question is raised as 
to whether there is a fundamental difference between an animal recognising its 
own image in a mirror and one recognising its own scent in yellow snow? As dogs 
prioritise smell above vision, it is entirely logical that they would ignore the visual 
cues in the mirror when not accompanied by identifying smells. Smell and sight 
involve different cognitive processes. Bekoff himself has suggested that the yellow 
snow test may be more indicative of a sense of “mine-ness” in dogs than of a 
sense of “I-ness”. In his discussion of Beckoff ’s paper Norris (n. p.) offers a critique 
of MSR experiments and those like it: “At a minimum […] the yellow snow test 
stands as a useful warning that we humans need to be careful not to make quick 
judgments about animal intelligence or cognitive capacity (or lack thereof) based 
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on tests that are well-suited to humans, but that fail to match the skills and abilities 
of the particular animal.”
Emotion and affect can be the primary means of communication between 
human and the other animal, one that I suggest cuts across species and allows 
for mutuality. Openness to other means of communication opposes reason with 
what Elizabeth Costello calls “fullness” and “the sensation of being” (Coetzee 78) 
suggesting that communication with other animals it is through the body—the 
semiotics of the body along with its primal sounds—gestures and noises that link 
us all together as animal-kind. Ron Broglio offers the intriguing suggestion that 
it is (contemporary) artists rather than philosophers who are likely to offer new 
insights into the question of the animal. As philosophy is delimited by language 
and reason “(including the limits of reason)”, artists are able to address the ques-
tion free from rational constraints in a material and engaged way. This is achieved 
not in the sense of: 
[…] mimesis or representing animals in a natural history tradition or kitsch as-
similation of animals into our world as tamed or cute or defeated; rather these art-
ists have unmoored themselves, even ever so slightly, from the cultural grounding 
of meaning and the solidification of being over becoming […] (Broglio xx).
The artistic process that is achieved through the manipulation of material and 
intuition mimics the encounters between human and the other animals thereby 
opening the way for new modes of thought and new possibilities for thinking 
about the animal other (Broglio xxi). 
NOTES
1.   Beck uses the analogue/digital opposition to emphasise his point that animals’ thinking 
processes are markedly different from the logos of dependent human practices.
2.   It is important to note that Chomsky, Hauser et al. later changed their minds about the 
uniqueness of human language, arguing for a much stronger continuity between animals and 
humans with respect to speech than previously believed (Haraway 235).
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